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1. Physicians as Agents
1. Cf. V. Fuchs, Who Shall Live? (New York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 58-59.
2. American Medical Association, Profile of Medical Practice, 1975-76 Ed.
(Chicago: American Medical Association, 1976), table 41.
3. U. Reinhardt, Physician Productivity and the Demand for Health Manpower
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975).
4. M. Feldstein, "Econometric Studies of Health Economics," in M. Intriligator
and D. Kendrick, eds., Frontiers of Quantitative Economics II (Amsterdam:
North Holland Publishing Co., 1974).
5. M. V. Pauly, "What Is Unnecessary Surgery?" Health and Society, The Mil-
bank Memorial Fund Quarterly 57 (Winter 1979):95-117.
6. D. Smallwood and K. Smith, "Optimal Treatment Decisions, Optimal Fee
Schedules, and the Allocation of Medical Resources," unpublished paper, Gradu-
ate School of Management, Northwestern University, 1976.
7. Feldstein, "Econometric Studies," suggests that it is easier for the patient to
communicate his financial position and tastes to the physician than for the physi-
cian to provide the patient with medical information. While there is little empirical
information, the communication of patient preferences hardly seems to be an easy
task, nor are typical medical encounters so complex that informing the patient
would always be undesirable.
8. Fuchs, Who Shall Live?
9. Reinhardt, Physician Productivity.
10. D. Coate, "The Optimal Employment of Inputs in Fee-for-service, for-
profit Health Practices: The Case of Optometrists," Explorations in Economic Re-
search 4 (Spring 1977): 316-30.
2. Physicians and Hospitals
1. R. Evans, "Behavioural Cost Functions for Hospitals," Canadian Journal of
Economics 4 (May 1971): 190-215.
2. For an analysis of hospital cost inflation based in part on this view, see M. S.
Feldstein, The Rising Cost of Hospital Care (Washington: Information Resources
Press, 1971).
3. J. Newhouse, "The Erosion of the Medical Marketplace," in W. Greenberg,
ed., Competition in the Health Care Sector: Past, Present, and Future (Washing-
ton: Federal Trade Commission, 1978).
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4. One additional qualification occurs if the mix of inputs used to treat a given
case can be altered by changing the mix of procedures. Suppose the cost-minimiz-
ing way of treating a given case is to use a relatively small amount of physician
time. Suppose "indemnity" type physician fee insurance pays x dollars for this pro-
cedure. Suppose the case can also be treated equally well by another procedure
which uses more physician time, but for which the indemnity level is sufficiently
high that the physician's net income per hour is greater. Then income-maximizing
physicians will use this other procedure. This is a specific illustration of the point
made in chapter 4, that when incentive neutrality is lacking, least-cost combina-
tions may not be chosen. Here the distortion in input mix arises not from the in-
surance coverage per se, but rather from the fee that the insurance pays.
5. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1965); Joseph Newhouse, "The Economics of Group Practice," Journal of
Human Resources 7 (Summer 1972): 37-56.
6. For an attempt to measure this influence, see M. V. Pauly, "The Effect of
Medical Staff Characteristics on Hospital Costs," Journal of Human Resources,
Supplement 13 (1978):77-111.
7. J. Newhouse, "Toward a Theory of Non-profit Institutions: An Economic
Model of a Hospital," American Economic Review 60 (March 1970) :211-26; M.
S. Feldstein, "Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price Dynamics,"
American Economic Review 61 (December 1971):853-72.
8. M. S. Feldstein, Economic Analysis for Health Services Efficiency (Amster-
dam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1967), p. 93.
3. Physician Influence on the Productivity of Hospitals:
Empirical Results
1. U. Reinhardt, "A Production Function for Physicians' Services," Review of
Economics and Statistics 54 (February 1972): 55-56.
2. M. Feldstein, Economic Analysis.
3. Reinhardt, "A Production Function."
4. V. Fuchs, "Health Services Research Moves Ahead," Health Services Re-
search (Fall 1969): 242-250.
5. One implication of these results is that increased medical staff will lower cost
per admission. Cost functions that were actually estimated with this data do indeed
show that hospitals in counties with more physicians or with more active medical
staff members tend to have lower costs per admission. These results contradict the
findings of Davis and Manning, which indicate that, in the hospitals in their data,
more medical staff members meant higher costs. (Cf. K. Davis, "The Role of Tech-
nology, Demand, and Labor Markets in the Determination of Hospital Costs," in
The Economics of Health and Medical Care, M. Perlman, ed. [London: MacMillan,
1974], pp. 283-301; W. G. Manning, Comparative Efficiency in Short-Term Gen-
eral Hospitals, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1975.) They attrib-
uted these higher costs to the difficulties of coordinating larger medical staffs. One
way to resolve this apparent conflict is to note that the hospitals Davis and Man-
ning looked at were primarily in SMSAs or at least in areas in which physicians
might be likely to hold appointments at more than one hospital. In such a situa-
tion, larger numbers of staff members might well not mean much more physician
time input, but would mean that each physician would bear a smaller share of the
costs of his cost-increasing actions. A result which confirms this interpretation can
also be found in M. Pauly, "Medical Staff Characteristics." In this study costs were
found to increase when the fraction of output for which the average physician is
the primary attending physician was smaller. It was also found that costs were sig-
nificantly higher in hospitals in which a larger fraction of patients had a primary125 Notes
attending physician who cared for three or fewer patients per month. Moreover, no
hospital in this study was the only hospital in the county, and over 80% were in
metropolitan areas.
6. Occupancy rates of less than 100% do not necessarily indicate excess capac-
ity, because a hospital faced with demand which is stochastic over short periods of
time would want to have some empty beds on average. An ideal occupancy rate
for all hospitals of about 80% is sometimes suggested in the literature, and for
the isolated rural hospitals in this sample a target of 75% might not be inappro-
priate.
7. The specification used by Reinhardt was also applied to this set of data. That
specification takes logarithms of all inputs which are theoretically needed in posi-
tive amounts, but is log-linear and log-quadratic in other inputs. The particular
specification used was
q = A + Si persnl + 82 beds + S3 nlip + ft GPs + ft. SURSPEC
+ ft MEDSPEC + ft OTHSPEC + ft HOSPBDS + 8(MDs)
2
where lower case variables represent logarithms.
The results_are roughly similar to those in tables 3.4 and 3.5. For example, for the
full sample, R
2 was .869 (vs. .869 in table 3.4) and the marginal admissions prod-
uct for a G.P. was 38.4 (vs. 31.3) and for a surgical specialist 54.7 (vs. 46.0).
8. Feldstein, Economic Analysis, pp. 78-79.
9. The latter interpretation is not, of course, consistent with the single-product
Cobb-Douglas form.
10. Fuchs, "Health Services Research."
4. Physician Information and the Consumer's Demand for Care
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3. M. Grossman, The Demand for Health (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1972).
4. To see this, note that when the distribution of f(gi) takes the degenerate form
(1, 0, 0, . . .), then the conditional and unconditional probabilities in Bayes'
formula are equal, and so f(gi\g$i) =f(gi)- If the distribution of f(gi) were
altered to (1 —e, Si, 82, . . .), Sa S = e, and if e were very small, then it follows
that the ratio of the conditional and unconditional probabilities could be made
virtually equal to one, for any likelihood function.
5. F. Sloan and R. Feldman, "Monopolistic Elements in the Market for Physi-
cians' Services," in W. Greenberg, ed., Competition in the Health Care Sector.
6. U. Reinhardt, "Parkinson's Law and the Demand for Physicians' Services," in
W. Greenberg, ed., Competition in the Health Care Sector.
7. R. Evans, "Supplier-Induced Demand," in M. Perlman, ed., The Economics
of Health and Medical Care (London: MacMillan, 1974).
8. M. Satterthwaite, "The Effect of Increased Supply on Physician Price: A
Theory for the Strange Case of Physicians Services," Center for Health Services
and Policy Research, Northwestern University, October, 1977.
9. M. V. Pauly and M. Satterthwaite, "The Effect of Physician Supply on Physi-
cian Price," Center for Health Services and Policy Research, Northwestern Uni-
versity, February, 1979.
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11. If enough consumers are able to detect slight reductions in accuracy, the
equilibrium level of accuracy will be "telling the truth"; the cost of reducing ac-
curacy, in the form of loss of customers, will exceed the gain from doing so. Even
if the number of physicians then increases, and some persons are less able to de-
tect reductions in accuracy, it may still not pay to reduce accuracy, because the
cost of reducing accuracy (even though less) still exceeds the gain from doing so.
12. G. Monsma, "Marginal Revenue and the Demand for Physician's Services"
in H. Klarman, ed., Empirical Studies in Health Economics (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1970).
13. U. Reinhardt has discussed this question in "Reimbursing Non-institutional
Providers," in Controls on Health Care (Washington: Institute of Medicine, 1975),
but he obtains conclusions which differ from those presented here.
14. An incentive system in which money income alone induces the physician to
act in each patient's interests has been discussed by Ross in the more general con-
text of the "principal-agent" problem. (Cf. S. Ross, "The Economic Theory of
Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review 63 (May 1973):
134-39.) But his results seem irrelevant to the empirical situation we are analyz-
ing. He concluded that the class of payoff structures or fee-schedules that maximize
the principal's (patient's) utility will be one in which fees depend upon the payoff
or outcome. The relevant outcome for physician's services would primarily be
health. Actual payments to physicians almost never depend upon the final health
outcome achieved. The only exceptions are that (1) if the health outcome is suffi-
ciently low and sufficiently unexpected, then a malpractice action will readjust the
fee received, and (2) in prepaid practice, improvements in health do reward the
agent insofar as they lead to lower demands for his services. This latter incentive
structure is also not ideal, since the agent is rewarded for any action that reduces
demand for his services, including death of the patient. Why approximations to
Ross's ideal fee schedules have failed to emerge in medical care, as in many other
places, is not easy to determine. The reason may be that it is so costly or impos-
sible concerning the outcome, and so easy for the principal to dissimulate about
the outcome actually achieved, that such arrangements are not really optimal.
15. On this point, see M. Pauly, "Managing Physicians: Economic Theory,"
Paper Presented at the Symposium on Hospital Affairs, University of Chicago,
Center for Health Administration Studies, June, 1979.
16. Monsma, "Marginal Revenue."
5. The Availability Effect: Empirical Results
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3. V. Fuchs and M. Kramer, Determinants of Expenditures for Physicians Ser-
vices in the U.S., 1948-68 (Washington: National Center for Health Services Re-
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Money Prices," RAND Corporation, May, 1973.
6. C. Phelps and J. Newhouse, "Coinsurance, the Price of Time, and the De-
mand for Medical Services," Review of Economics and Statistics 56 (August 1974):
334-42.
7. If the prices of inputs or the quantity of inputs are fixed below the market-
clearing level, then excess demand will occur. Increases in supply will then permit
more use if this excess demand becomes manifest. This explanation would seem to
be the appropriate one for the "availability effect" observed by Feldstein in his127 Notes
study of hospital care in the United Kingdom. (Feldstein, Economic Analysis). It
is certain that there is excess demand for hospital beds in the U.K., and money
user price is zero, so that variations in bed supply will be related to use because
of variations in the extent of excess demand.
8. M. S. Feldstein, "The Rising Price of Physicians' Services," Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 52 (May 1970) : 121-33.
9. J. Newhouse and F. Sloan, "Physician Pricing: Monopolistic or Competitive:
Reply," Southern Economic Journal 38 (April 1972):577-80.
10. R. Evans, "Supplier-Induced Demand."
11. Ibid., p. 18.
12. A similar point is made by Sloan and Feldman, "Monopolistic Elements".
13. Evans, "Supplier-Induced Demand," p. 21.
14. Sloan and Feldman, "Monopolistic Elements".
15. For a description of the survey and the data, see National Center for Health
Statistics, Health Survey Procedure: Concepts, Questionnaire Development, and
Definitions in the Health Interview Survey, Vital and Health Statistics, Series L,
No. 2, May, 1964, and U.S. National Health Survey, The Statistical Design of The
Health Household-Interview Survey, Health Statistics, Series A-2, Public Health
Service, Washington, D.C., July, 1958.
16. Prices are reported in J. Wooldridge, The Price of Medical Care as Reflected
in a Survey of the 100 Largest SMSA's, Policy Analysis Series No. 10, Mathe-
matica, Inc., 1975.
17. J. Newhouse and C. Phelps, "New Estimates of the Price and Income Elas-
ticities of Medical Care Services," in R. Rosett, ed., The Role of Health Insurance
in the Health Services Sector, (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1976). K. Davis and R. Reynolds, "The Impact of Medicare and Medicaid on Ac-
cess to Medical Care," in Rosett, ed., Role of Health Insurance.
18. Newhouse and Phelps, "New Estimates".
19. Although price is endogenous to the market area and is affected by the de-
mand creation efforts of physicians overall, it is probably not strongly affected by
the efforts applied to a relatively small fraction of the population (e.g., the un-
educated poor).
20. B. Friedman, "On the Rationing of Health Services and Resource Availabil-
ity," Journal of Human Resources, Supplement 13 (1978) :57-75.
21. M. Grossman and E. Rand, "Consumer Incentives for Health Services in
Chronic Illness," in S. Mushkin, ed., Consumer Incentives for Health Care (New
York: Prodist., 1974).
22. Such effects have been found in Newhouse and Phelps, "New Estimates,"
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6. Hospital Beds, Hospital-oriented Physicians, and Hospital Use
1. M. S. Feldstein, "Hospital Cost Inflation."
2. J. P. Bunker, "Surgical Manpower," New England Journal of Medicine 282
(January 15, 1970):135-44.
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for the high education group, which would appear to be more consistent with a
time cost theory than an information manipulation theory.
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